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Lessons for the government from Miller I and the Scottish Continuity Bill 
case 
Sarah Court-Brown* 
Abstract In the United Kingdom (UK), tensions between the executive and the judiciary 
reignited recently when the government launched a thinly veiled ‘attack’ on the courts in an 
‘Independent Review of Administrative Law’ (IRAL). 1  Largely understood to have been 
triggered by the government’s defeats in the Miller cases,2 the IRAL seems intended to limit 
the availability of judicial review against the government. 3  This article revisits some 
(unpublished) arguments made by the author at the time of the Miller I judgment about its true 
driving force.4 It also considers a similar impulse in the Scottish Continuity Bill case5 that was 
considered around the same time.6 It argues that the Supreme Court’s procedural protections 
of EU-derived rights and the devolution settlement with Scotland in these cases represent a 
threat to the executive government. This is because these cases make it more difficult for the 
government to overcome the common law constitution without proper Parliamentary scrutiny. 
1. Introduction 
In a country without a codified constitution, it can be difficult to answer questions about 
constitutional arrangements. Yet that is precisely what Brexit required the UK to achieve. 
Article 50(1) TEU prescribed that the UK should withdraw from the European Union ‘in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements.’ 7  This raised some very practical 
questions. Which branch of government had the power to commit the UK to leaving the EU, 
for example, and must Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland consent to the legislation 
regulating Britain’s withdrawal? For better or worse, the UK Supreme Court was called upon 
 
* Queen Mary University of London. 
1Ministry of Justice, ‘Independent Review of Administrative Law’ (GOV.UK)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/independent-review-of-administrative-law> accessed 16 November 
2020. 
2 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for exiting the European Union 
(Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5 (Miller I);R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister 
(Respondent) [2019] UKSC 41 (Miller II). 
3 See also  Melanie Carter and Sarah Court-Brown, ‘Government Announces Independent Review of Judicial 
Review’ (Law Society Gazette) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/government-announces-
independent-review-of-judicial-review/5105287.article> accessed 16 November 2020. 
4 Sarah Court-Brown, ‘Common Law Constitutionalism in the UKSC’s Recent Brexit Adjudication: A Silver 
Lining for Devolution and Rights’, QMUL PhD conference (2019), unpublished. 
5 Re UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill[2018] UKSC 64, [2019] 2 WLR 
1. (“Scottish Continuity Bill case) 
6 Miller I (n 2). 
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
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to answer such constitutional questions and open that ‘box filled with dark matter, the deeper 
reaches of the British Constitution’.8 This was either because a judicial review claim was 
brought against a proposed course of action, with final appeal to the Supreme Court (as in 
Miller I), or because the Court had been appointed as adjudicator in a constitutional statute (as 
in the Scottish Continuity Bill case9).  
This article revisits some (unpublished) arguments made by the author at the time10  
about the true force of the Miller I and Scottish Continuity Bill case judgments.11 It argues that 
whilst the Supreme Court continues to recognise Parliamentary Sovereignty as the UK’s rule 
of recognition, these cases also saw it offer protection to fundamental rights and the UK’s 
devolution settlements in the common law. The Court’s protections were procedural rather than 
substantive in nature, and they were subtle. However, they represent a threat to the current 
government, since they make it harder for the government to legislate to overcome the common 
law constitution (including fundamental rights) without proper Parliamentary scrutiny. This 
may be one factor that prompted the IRAL.  
This article is structured as follows. Sections 1 and 2 map theories of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and the common law constitution relevant to Miller I and the Scottish Continuity 
Bill case. Section 3 explores tensions between these two conceptions of the constitution. 
Section 4 considers how these tensions unfolded in Miller I in relation to the Article 50 
question, and what this reveals about the attitude of the Supreme Court to the UK constitution. 
Section 5 completes the same exercise for the devolution questions in Miller I and the Scottish 
Continuity Bill case.  
2. Parliamentary Sovereignty  
It is well known that for Dicey, Parliamentary Sovereignty meant that Parliament had 
‘the right to make or unmake any law whatever’ and ‘that no person or body [was] recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside [its] legislation’.12 Parliamentary 
 
8  Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘What Will Happen next? Brexit and the Parliamentary Possibilities’ 
<www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/what-will-happen-next-brexit-and-the-parliamentary-possibilities> 
accessed 23 January 2019. 
9 Re UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill (n 5). 
10 Sarah Court-Brown, ‘Common Law Constitutionalism in the UKSC’s Recent Brexit Adjudication: A Silver 
Lining for Devolution and Rights’, QMUL PhD conference (2019), unpublished. 
11 Miller I (n 2); Re UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill (n 5). 
12 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund 1982) 3–4. 
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Sovereignty was the most important of Dicey’s ‘guiding principles’ of the constitution, 13 since 
none of the others14 could override it. 
Dicey’s orthodox theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty has been disputed over the years, 
although it has never entirely gone out of fashion. Many people disagree with Dicey’s view 
that Parliament can make or unmake any law whatever, arguing that Parliament cannot make a 
law if it is unable to satisfy the manner and form requirements set by past Parliaments, for 
example, those in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 prescribing the form Parliament must 
take for certain legislative acts.15 Jennings, for example, argued that if Parliament set manner 
and form restrictions on future Parliaments in statute, the Courts would be bound to apply 
them.16 Nonetheless, some consider that Parliament’s ability to bind future Parliaments an 
expression of its unfettered sovereignty. Manner and form restrictions do not stop Parliament 
being sovereign in the sense that ‘it still has no law-making superior’, so the argument goes 
(the ‘self-embracing’ theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty).17  Others do not agree that manner 
and form restrictions fetter Parliament at all. For Wade, the important point was that the Courts 
could not apply restrictions over and above Parliament’s power to repeal such restrictions, 
therefore Parliament remained sovereign (‘continuing’ Parliamentary Sovereignty).18  
This was also the debate around Britain’s membership of the EU.19 Some considered 
section 2(4) of the European Communities Act (‘ECA 1972’), which made construction of Acts 
of Parliament subject to the incorporation of European Law, a direct challenge to Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. This argument was made because section 2(4) imposed substantive rather than 
procedural restrictions on how the UK Parliament could legislate during its EU membership,20 
as seen in action in the Factortame litigation when the House of Lords disapplied part of an 
Act of Parliament for incompatibility with EU law. 21  However, others argued that since 
 
13 ibid 25. 
14 The rule of law and constitutional conventions  - ibid xxxvi; cxlv–cxlviii; 120–121; 279–299. 
15 See, for example, Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th edn, University of London Press 1958) 152–
156; RFV Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Clarendon 2012) 9–16. 
16 Jennings (n 15) 140–156. 
17 Peter C Oliver, ‘Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century’ (2003) 14 KCLJ 137, 149–150. 
18 HWR Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ (1955) 13 CLJ 172, 175–176. 
19 Although interestingly Wade himself thought that Britain’s EU membership had changed the country’s rule of 
recognition – see HWR Wade, ‘Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 LQR  568. 
20 NW Barber, ‘The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2011) 9 ICON 144, 149. 
21 R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex P Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 (HL ) [659]. 
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Parliament retained the right to repeal the ECA 1972 and override the restrictions applied in 
Factortame, it remained sovereign.22  
3. Common Law Constitutionalism 
By contrast with Parliamentary Sovereignty, common law constitutionalism provides a 
different perspective on what is the most important guiding principle of the British constitution. 
Common law constitutionalism may be defined as the theory that the Courts, rather than 
Parliament, act as the guardians of the constitution, by developing fundamental rights and 
values in the common law.23 Such fundamental rights and values are often seen as morally or 
logically a priori other constitutional principles, and therefore the argument is sometimes made 
(including by some in the judiciary)24 that common law rights and values should, if the conflict 
ever arose, even override Acts of Parliament.25  
Common law constitutionalism has many opponents, including amongst other members 
of the judiciary,26 who dismiss the idea that common law rights and values override other 
constitutional principles, particularly Parliamentary Sovereignty.27  Many prefer to see the 
mechanism of the common law (judicial review) as no more than the principled enforcement 
of the ultra vires doctrine (in keeping with Parliamentary Sovereignty) that all public bodies 
must act within the powers conferred on them in Acts of Parliament.28 However, others have 
called the ultra vires argument a ‘fig leaf’ covering the fact that the Courts are slowly 
developing the common law as a higher order of law-making, and ask how the Courts could 
have a supervisory jurisdiction over powers with no basis in statute (for example, prerogative 
powers) if the only motivation for judicial review were Acts of Parliament.29 
The rights and values of the common law are subject to debate between supporters of 
common law constitutionalism. Laws identifies the high-level values of ‘reason, fairness and 
 
22 See the debate in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 
2003).  
23 Thomas Poole, ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 
OJLS 435, 439, 448. 
24 John Laws, The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge University Press 2014); Jackson and others v Attorney 
General [2005] UKHL 56 [102]. 
25 See Poole (n 23) 439, 448; Laws (n 24). 
26 Jonathan Sumption, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary’ (2011) 16 JR 301. 
27 See JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1. 
28 Paul Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ in Christopher Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Hart 2000) . 
29  See Christopher Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and Judicial Review’, in Christopher Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart 2000) . 
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the presumption of liberty’ as the ‘common law’s insights’.30 Oliver, by contrast, identifies the 
slightly different, but no less high-level, values of ‘autonomy, dignity, respect, status, and 
security’.31 However, many join Jowell in pointing to a series of cases in which the Courts have 
slowly protected a collection of ‘individual democratic rights’ using the principle of legality,32 
rather than attempting to create a finite list of high-level values.33  The principle of legality 
means that ‘fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words’ of 
Parliament and the Courts ‘presume that even the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual’.34 Jowell argues that the development of such 
individual democratic rights has been assisted by the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’), 
but such rights did not originate in statute, and nor were they created by judges. They emanated 
‘from the framework of modern democracy within which Parliament legislates’. They ‘are not 
a consequence of the democratic process but logically prior to it'’.35  
Some argue that the common law constitution has been used by the Courts to protect 
more than individual democratic rights. For example, Anthony adds ‘the nature of the UK’s 
devolution settlement’ to the values developed and protected in the common law.36 He notes a 
series of cases in which the Courts have interpreted the devolution statutes as generously as 
possible to allow the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies the utmost ability to legislate in 
devolved areas. However, Anthony notes that this line of jurisprudence has yet to realise the 
potential of Lord Steyn’s obiter comments in Jackson about divided sovereignty becoming the 
new reality of the UK constitution.37  
4. Tensions between Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Common Law Constitution  
There is a clear tension in British theory about whether Parliamentary Sovereignty, or 
the rights and values of the common law – or both – are the modern guiding principles of the 
UK constitution. This often leads to the question of whether there is anything Parliament cannot 
do because it is restrained by the common law (a substantive restriction on Parliament).38 
 
30 Laws (n 24) 3. 
31 Dawn Oliver, ‘Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/Private Divide’ (1997) 12 PL 360, 
369. 
32 Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review’ [2000] PL 671, 672–673. 
33 Stephen Sedley, ‘The Common Law and the Constitution’ (1997) 19 London Review of Books 8, 8–11; see 
also the discussion in Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction (OUP Oxford 2013) 
113–114. 
34 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex P Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131. 
35 Jowell (n 32) 672-673. 
36 Gordon Anthony, ‘Brexit and the Common Law Constitution’ (2018) 24 EPL 673, 673. 
37 ibid 687-689. 
38 Most clearly expressed in Jackson and others v Attorney General (n 24). 
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However, it may also be posed as a question about whether there is anything Parliament must 
do in a certain way because it is restrained by the common law constitution (a procedural 
restriction on Parliament).39 The Supreme Court was required to grapple with the roles played 
by these two competing conceptions of constitutionalism in Miller I and the Scottish Continuity 
Bill case, therefore these two judgments provided an interesting opportunity for the Court to 
re-evaluate them.  
5. The Article 50 Question: Miller I 
The tension between Parliamentary Sovereignty and common law constitutionalism 
played out most obviously in relation to the Article 50 question in Miller I. The Supreme Court 
commenced its judgement by setting out a fairly orthodox version of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty which it called ‘a fundamental principle of the UK constitution’.40 It defined 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, following Dicey, as ‘the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever’ and the principle that ‘no person or body is recognised by the law as having a right 
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’. It also emphasized, like Dicey, that the 
will of Parliament was to be divined from statute, and ‘not in any other way’.41  
It clarified that Britain’s membership of the EU had not been the death of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. Its view was that whilst Parliament had temporarily allowed EU law to take 
precedence over domestic statutes, this effect of the ECA 1972 would ‘only last so long as 
Parliament wishe[d]’ and the ECA 1972 could be ‘repealed like any other statute’.42 This 
accorded with continuing Parliamentary Sovereignty43 since any subsequent Parliament could 
undo the actions of the 1972 Parliament, Parliamentary Sovereignty remained the main guiding 
principle of the UK constitution.44 The ECA 1972 was no more than a ‘conduit pipe’45 by 
which EU law had been introduced into domestic law and it could be repealed at any time, thus 
undoing the restriction it placed on law-making.46  
 
39 See Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin). 
40 Miller I (n 2) [43]; although not "the most fundamental rule" as in R (on the application of Miller and another) 
v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) [20]. 
41 Miller I (n 2) [43]. 
42 ibid [60]. 
43 Wade (n 18) 175–176. 
44 Miller I (n 2) [60]. 
45  Citing John Finnis, ‘Brexit and the Balance of Our Constitution’ (Judicial Power Project) 
<http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Finnis-2016-Brexit-and-the-Balance-of-Our-
Constitution2.pdf> accessed 3 April 2019.  
46 Miller I (n 2)[65]. 
7 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
Having made this ‘powerful restatement’ of Parliamentary Sovereignty,47 the Court 
went on to decide what the principle meant in practice. The case turned on whether the 
Executive’s treaty-making prerogative power (which the claimants accepted extended to the 
unmaking of treaties)48 could be used to ‘frustrate domestic law, in particular, rights or a 
scheme created by Parliament’. The UK government argued that it could use the prerogative to 
amend domestic law unless proscribed by statute;49 the claimants argued amending domestic 
law was forbidden unless specifically permitted in statute. 50 
The Supreme Court noted a principle from the Case of Proclamations51 / Bill of Rights 
1688 which, it said, established a ‘fundamental principle of the UK constitution’ that ‘unless 
primary legislation permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable ministers to change 
[domestic] statute law or common law’.52 The Court concluded that withdrawing from the EU 
treaties would change domestic law and that triggering Article 50 TEU would ultimately cause 
the repeal of the ECA 1972.53 Further, that once that had occurred, domestic rights would be 
lost. For example, the right of UK citizens to benefit from employment protections such as the 
Working Time Directive.54  Therefore, Parliamentary approval was required for triggering 
Article 50 and withdrawing the UK from the EU. Thus, the executive government could not 
act on its own.  
It is interesting that the Article 50 question in Miller turned on the loss of rights. It was 
because of this that the Court could be sure domestic law would be changed as a result of 
triggering Article 50 TEU;55 and this brought the principle from the Case of Proclamations / 
Bill of Rights 1688 into play.56 The rights that the Supreme Court focused upon in its judgment 
in Miller were ‘rights capable of replication in UK law’. They included: 
 
47 Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing, and Christopher Knight, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson 
Higher Ed 2018) 137. 
48 Miller I (n 2) [54]. 
49 ‘Miller Day 2 Transcript’ (The Supreme Court, 6 December 2016) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/draft-
transcript-tuesday-161206.pdf accessed 5 March 2019, 37-38. 
50 ibid 159–160. 
51 Case of Proclamations [1610] 1 WLUK 46 (HL), 77 ER 1352.  
52 Miller I (n 2)[50]; Paul P Craig, ‘Miller, Structural Constitutional Review and the Limits of Prerogative Power’ 
[2017] PL 48.  
53 Miller I (n 2)[92]–[94]. 
54 ibid [69]–[73]. Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time OJ L299/9. 
55 It is not clear whether the CJEU’s later decision in Wightman would have changed the Supreme Court’s 
certainty on this point - see C-621/18 Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.  
56 Miller I (n 2) [69]–[73].  
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“The rights of UK citizens to the benefit of employment protection such as the Working 
Time Directive, to equal treatment and to the protection of EU competition law, and the right 
of non-residents to the benefit of the “four freedoms” (free movement of people, goods and 
capital, and freedom to provide services).”57 
Some of these rights, said the Court, had ‘already been embodied in UK law by 
domestic legislation pursuant to section 2(2) of the 1972 Act’.58 However, some rights had not. 
Thus, whilst an Act of Parliament (the ECA 1972) had allowed this second category of rights 
to have effect, no Act of the UK Parliament had created them.  
Shortly after making clear that it was not only concerned with rights created by the UK 
Parliament, the Supreme Court expressly approved and applied the principle of legality,59 
which has been celebrated as a judicial mechanism amongst common law constitutionalists.60 
When applied to the facts, the principle of legality, which requires fundamental rights not to be 
overridden by general or ambiguous words, transpired to have important consequences. In 
particular, since the ECA 1972 did not mention the use of the prerogative to withdraw from the 
EU treaties, the Court could not accept that Parliament had ‘“squarely confront[ed]” the notion 
that it was clothing ministers with the […] right to use a treaty-making power to remove […] 
important domestic rights’.61  
Arguably, by applying the principle of legality at this juncture, the Court highlighted 
that EU-derived rights, including some not recognised in statute by the UK Parliament, had 
gained ‘fundamental’62 status in the UK constitution. The Court did not expand upon this point 
(perhaps this would have been too controversial at such a fraught time), however, it is certainly 
possible that these rights were seen to be fundamental because they accorded with the values 
of the common law.  
The effect of applying the principle of legality was that Parliament could not override 
the relevant EU-derived rights with general or ambiguous words; it had to squarely confront 
this action. 63 Poole argues that this holds the ‘key’ to the whole Miller judgment.64  Since the 
 
57 ibid [70]. 
58 ibid. 
59 Miller I (n 2)[87]; citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex P Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
60 See, for example, Jowell (n 32). 
61 Miller I (n 2)[87]. 
62 The language used in the definition of the principle of legality adopted from Ex P Simms.  
63 Miller I (n 2)[87]. 
64 Thomas Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case’ (2017) 80 MLR 696, 700. 
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ECA 1972 did not squarely confront the loss of rights “the Simms doctrine required clear 
statutory authorisation to trigger Article 50”.65 Therefore, Parliament had to effect the change.  
This interpretation of the Court’s judgment appears more logical than the Court’s 
attempts to use Parliamentary Sovereignty to explain its judgment.66 Triggering Article 50 
TEU would amend fundamental rights in the UK, therefore Parliamentary action was required 
to squarely confront that decision. This is a procedural rather than a substantive limit on 
Parliament. Indeed, Miller I ultimately does not prevent the UK Parliament from enacting in 
legislation a policy it seeks to pursue, even one that overrides fundamental rights. It simply 
requires legislation to squarely confront that decision.67 However, the procedural protection of 
EU-derived fundamental rights provided by the Supreme Court focused attention on the 
important constitutional decision and forced enhanced scrutiny by Parliament. This ensured 
Parliament properly considered the decision and made sure that it was not rushed through under 
the radar by the executive government. This is certainly what upset the executive about the 
Miller I judgment, and it may have prompted the attack on judicial review in the IRAL.  
6. Devolution: Miller I and the Scottish Continuity Bill case 
The Supreme Court’s answer to the devolved competence question in Miller I and the 
Scottish Continuity Bill case initially appears, once again, to have been a ‘reassertion of 
orthodoxy’ on Parliamentary Sovereignty.68 Like Dicey, the Court suggested that in both cases 
it believed that the UK system of government was unitary, with sovereignty concentrated in 
the UK Parliament rather than belonging to the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies.69 Far 
from comments made by Lady Hale in 2012 suggesting that the UK had become a federal 
state,70 and (minority) comments by Lord Thomas in the Supreme Court in 2015 that perhaps 
equated devolution with a ‘nascent federalism in the UK’,71 the Supreme Court in Miller I and 
the Scottish Continuity Bill case emphasised that the UK Parliament had reserved its right to 
legislate on devolved matters, even without consent.72 This was despite the Sewel convention 
that ‘the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 For issues with the Parliamentary Sovereignty explanation of Miller I see M Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s 
Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional Principle’ (2017) 76 CLJ 257. 
67 Anthony (n 36) 685-686. 
68 ibid 690. 
69 Dicey (n 12) 74; Scottish Continuity Bill Case (n 5) [12]. 
70 Baroness Brenda Marjorie Hale, ‘The Supreme Court in the UK Constitution’ (The Supreme Court, 12 October 
2012) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121012.pdf> accessed 15 February 2019, 23. 
71 Anthony (n 36) 687-689; Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Disease (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3. 
72 Miller I (n 2) [136]. 
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with the agreement of the devolved legislatures’. 73 As far as the Court was concerned, the 
Sewel convention was unenforceable.74 For the Court to enforce it would be contrary to the 
nature of a political convention, which was “political in inception and [depended] on a 
consistent course of political recognition”.75 This was not changed by the recognition of the 
Sewel convention in some of the devolution legislation.76  
In the context of Miller I, in which the key devolution argument considered relied upon 
the Sewel convention, this meant that the Supreme Court would not require the UK Parliament 
to obtain devolved consent before passing its Brexit legislation.77 This implied that the UK 
Parliament was not constrained by any common law restrictions protecting the devolution 
settlements, but in reality, the Court barely considered the point, since it effectively found it 
had no jurisdiction to hear a case relying on the Sewel convention.  
By contrast, the Court did have jurisdiction to consider the devolution questions raised 
in the Scottish Continuity Bill case about the lawfulness of what was effectively the Scottish 
Parliament’s own EU Withdrawal Bill.78  This was because the Supreme Court had a power 
under section 33 of the Scotland Act 1998 (“Scotland Act”) to consider whether Scottish 
legislation was within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.  
The Court’s starting point in the Scottish Continuity Bill case was that the Scottish 
Parliament had competence to pass its own legislation, provided that: (i) it was not 
incompatible with EU law; (ii) it did not relate to a matter reserved to the UK Parliament in 
Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act; and (iii) it did not amend an enactment protected from 
modification by Schedule 4 of the Scotland Act.79  The Court quickly dismissed the UK 
government’s claim that the whole of the Scottish continuity bill was outside competence, a 
small victory for Scotland. Instead, the Court chose to assess whether any of the provisions of 
the Scottish continuity bill would have the unlawful effects proscribed by the Scotland Act 
and/or whether its provisions were unlawful for some other reason (for example, conflict with 
Parliamentary Sovereignty). 
 
73 ibid [138], [147]. 
74 ibid [141]. 
75 Citing Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753,774–775. 
76 Miller I (n 2)[148]. 
77 ibid [148]. 
78 SP Bill 28B UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill [as passed] Session 
5 (2018). 
79 Scottish Continuity Bill Case (n 5) [15]. Applying section 29 of the Scotland Act. 
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Much of the bill was dispatched with at the very end of the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
Having gone to much effort to set out why the bill was not entirely out of competence,80 the 
Court went on to find that all the provisions of the Scottish bill that conflicted with the UK 
Withdrawal Act were outside competence. It made this finding because the UK Withdrawal 
Act had amended Schedule 4 of the Scotland Act to make itself a protected statute,81 which 
meant that the Scottish Parliament could not modify it, and the Supreme Court found that much 
of the Scottish bill did modify the UK Withdrawal Act.82 Thus, everything in the Scottish bill 
that amended the UK Withdrawal Act was outside competence, and was “not law”.83 This 
encompassed many of the important differences between the two enactments.84 
Was this a recognition of the Sovereignty of the UK Parliament as the key guiding 
principle of the constitution? On the one hand, the Supreme Court emphasised the legitimacy 
of “legislation by the UK Parliament which amends the Scotland Act and thereby changes the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament after the Scottish Parliament has passed a 
Bill”.85 This recognises the legitimacy of (even underhand) decisions by the UK Parliament to 
change the rules on competence after the Scottish Parliament has relied on them, which is 
consistent with a sovereign UK Parliament that has the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever. On the other hand, the Court focused on the ability of the UK Parliament to change 
the rules on competence as an effect of the Scotland Act, 86  rather than as an effect of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. This could imply that it did not mean to emphasize Parliamentary 
Sovereignty over the status of the Scotland Act as a “constitutional settlement”.87 This was just 
the meaning of that constitutional settlement.  
The latter interpretation seemed to be supported when the Court specifically considered 
the effects of Parliamentary Sovereignty on section 17 of the Scottish bill, requiring the consent 
 
80 ibid [28]-[35]. Note that the Scottish Parliament is competent to regulate the legal consequences in Scotland of 
the cessation of EU law relating to devolved matters, provided that it does it consistently with the Scotland Act 
1998.  
81 Controversially, the Court considered the effect of UK Withdrawal Act at the date of the hearing, rather than at 
the time the Scottish bill was passed. When the Scottish bill was passed, the UK Withdrawal Act was not a 
protected statute. See Christopher McCorkindale and Aileen McHarg, ‘Continuity and Confusion: Towards 
Clarity? – The Supreme Court and the Scottish Continuity Bill’ (UK Constitutional Law Association Blog) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/12/20/chris-mccorkindale-and-aileen-mcharg-continuity-and-confusion-
towards-clarity-the-supreme-court-and-the-scottish-continuity-bill/> accessed 15 February 2019. 
82 Scottish Continuity Bill Case (n 5) [92]-[94].  
83 ibid [124]. 
84 See ibid [101]–[124]. 
85 ibid [97]. Emphasis added. 
86 ibid [93]–[94]. 
87 ibid [12]. 
12 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
of the Scottish ministers to retained EU law affecting Scotland. The two relevant considerations 
for the Court when considering the lawfulness of this provision were the Sovereignty of the 
UK Parliament and section 28(7) of the Scotland Act, which provides that ‘This section [“Acts 
of the Scottish Parliament”] does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
to make laws for Scotland.’ 
The Court found that section 17 of the Scottish bill modified section 28(7) of the 
Scotland Act, which was protected from modification, therefore section 17 of the Scottish bill 
was outside competence. However, the Court found that section 17 of the Scottish bill did not 
separately impinge upon the Sovereignty of Parliament, since Parliamentary Sovereignty was 
to be read in light of the rest of the Scotland Act, and did not otherwise protect UK legislation 
from the effects of Scottish legislation. Thus the Court established that, as long as Scottish 
legislation is within competence pursuant to the Scotland Act, the Scottish Parliament can 
legislate differently from the UK Parliament. Parliamentary Sovereignty will not be 
compromised. The UK Parliament would eventually have to ‘amend, disapply or repeal 
[Scottish legislation]’ to proceed.88  
This may suggest that the Court does place value on the Scotland Act as a permanent 
constitutional settlement to be protected in the common law, since it is willing to interpret 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in light of the Scotland Act. For Elliott, this part of the judgment 
also suggests that the Supreme Court’s conception of Parliamentary Sovereignty allows for 
procedural restrictions. This is because it ‘implies a preparedness to disaggregate the question 
of whether Parliament is sovereign” from the question of whether the exercise of Parliament’s 
legislative authority is subject to any form of condition’. 89  
The effect of the Scottish Continuity Bill judgment is that whilst the UK Parliament will 
ultimately always be able to pass legislation for Scotland under section 28(7) of the Scotland 
Act, it will probably need to frame this as an expression of its power under the Scotland Act, 
rather than relying on Parliamentary Sovereignty as a standalone principle. This means 
acknowledging the ability of the Scottish Parliament to pass legislation on devolved matters 
and acknowledging that any such legislation will need to be amended, disapplied, or repealed 
specifically before Parliament enacts its own policy in Scotland. This is a procedural hurdle on 
 
88 ibid [63]. 
89 Mark Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s Judgment in the Scottish Continuity Bill Case’ (Public Law for Everyone, 
14 December 2018)  <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2018/12/14/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-the-
scottish-continuity-bill-case/> accessed 15 February 2019, 7. 
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the UK Parliament’s ability to legislate for Scotland in devolved areas and may be an attempt 
by the Supreme Court to protect the spirit of the devolution settlements as a value of the 
common law.  
Like the Supreme Court’s procedural protection of fundamental rights in Miller I, the 
Supreme Court’s procedural protection of the devolution settlements in the Scottish Continuity 
Bill case was subtle. The Court did not specifically establish that it was holding Parliament to 
the terms of the Scotland Act, in the common law, over and above Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
Probably this would have been too controversial in the fraught political climate surrounding 
Brexit. Nonetheless, the effect of the Scottish Continuity Bill case was to protect, in a 
procedural manner, the ability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate for Scotland. The 
requirement for the UK Parliament to amend, disapply or repeal Scottish legislation before 
enacting its own policy in Scotland ensured enhanced consideration, and therefore scrutiny, of 
decisions to override the spirit of the devolution settlements.  
Overall, whilst it is possible to see Miller I and the Scottish Continuity Bill cases as a 
powerful restatement of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament in the devolution context, this 
was not rigorously put to the test in Miller I, given the Court’s findings on jurisdiction. In the 
Scottish Continuity Bill case, the Supreme Court’s focus on the effects of the Scotland Act over 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and its willingness to see Scottish legislation as a procedural 
limitation on Parliament may suggest that it does place emphasis (in the common law) on the 
Scotland Act as a fundamental part of the UK’s constitutional arrangements.  
The Supreme Court’s procedural protection of the Scotland Act in the Scottish 
Continuity Bill case again ensured enhanced Parliamentary scrutiny of an important 
constitutional decision, namely the UK Parliament’s decision to proceed with the Brexit 
legislation without devolved consent.90 This ensured that the decision was not rushed through 
under the radar by the executive government. This was likely another judgment that upset the 
government in advance of the IRAL.  
7. Conclusion 
In Miller I and the Scottish Continuity Bill cases, the Supreme Court grappled with two 
competing conceptions of the UK constitution: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the common 
 
90 Which is what eventually happened following the case.  
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law constitution. As a result, these judgments enhance our understanding of the modern guiding 
principle(s) of the UK constitution.  
Whilst the Supreme Court said in Miller I that Parliamentary Sovereignty remained the 
UK’s rule of recognition, its judgment on the Article 50 question makes more sense when 
viewed as an application of the common law constitution.  Fundamental rights would be lost 
as a result of triggering Article 50, therefore Parliament not only had to permit the loss of those 
rights, but also to ‘squarely confront’ their loss by effecting the constitutional change in 
legislation.  
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the Scotland Act as a procedural restriction on the 
UK Parliament’s ability to legislate for Scotland in the Scottish Continuity Bill case offered 
protection to the Scottish devolution settlement in the common law.91  
The common law protections offered by these judgments focused attention on 
important constitutional decisions around Brexit and forced their enhanced scrutiny  by 
Parliament. This ensured they could not be rushed through under the radar by the executive 
government. These are two judgments likely to have upset the executive government, which 
has now launched a counterattack in the IRAL. We wait with bated breath for the Courts to 
land the next blow if the IRAL is implemented as threatened. 
Note that this article was finalised for publication before the government published its 
response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law.92 Nonetheless, the arguments 
in it remain valid about the possible motivation behind the original Review. 
 
91 Anthony (n 36) 687–689. 
92 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial Review Reform’ (Consultation 2021) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/judicial-review-reform> accessed on 18 August 2021. 
